Search and destroy advanced warfare how to#

However, HackworthвЂ™s statement did not adequately address how the enemy would respond. For Hackworth, the operation revealed that вЂњweвЂ™d be able to fight the same protracted war of attrition the enemy was willing to fight, without paying the heavy, heavy price in American lives.вЂќ Such a vision relied on the ability of American forces to out maneuver the enemy through the use of air mobility. He noted that Geronimo I produced a 10:1 kill ratio and вЂњthe very high weapons-to-body count ratio (143 weapons, individual and crew-served, to 149 enemy dead)вЂќ as proof of success.

Search and destroy advanced warfare how to#

Army Colonel David Hackworth considered Operation Geronimo I an example of how to defeat the enemy in South Vietnam. IFFV tasked these troops with the mission of вЂњfinding and destroying elements of the 95th NVA Regiment by conducting a deliberate search of all trails, streambeds and probable avenues of egress along the SONG KY LO River In northwest DONG XUAN District.вЂќ During those two days, the Americans located a sprawling enemy base area, which included вЂњa manufacturing site containing two forges and an extensive hospital-dispensary.вЂќ Such physical evidence of enemy activity and infrastructure revealed the Ky Lo Valley as a noteworthy PAVN and PLAF staging area for Communist operations in the province.

On 10 and 11 November, elements the 95th PAVN Regiment found itself surrounded in the Ky Lo Valley by the soldiers of the 4th Infantry Division.

Other IFFV assets, however, made a more crucial find. These American troops made contact with a PAVN force of an estimated one-hundred soldiers. Between the end of October until 8 November, elements of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division exploited intelligence-gathered during previous operations-of PAVN movement in the remote mountainous areas of western Phu Yen. forces made contact with the 95th PAVN Regiment. The climax of Geronimo I transpired when U.S. Army participants in the operation included the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division and the 4th Infantry Division. If Operation Geronimo I could finally bring those remaining enemy forces to a Waterloo-like battle, IFFV would significantly further the safeguarding of the provinceвЂ™s rice harvest and long-term stability under the Saigon government, a process that began early in the year with Operation Jefferson. Before Geronimo I, enemy main forces had largely survived IFFVвЂ™s previous operations in Phu Yen. A deluge of rainfall severely limited the effectiveness of Geronimo II, while IFFV cancelled the third phase. Having begun on 31 October, Geronimo I called for bringing battle to the largely illusive PeopleвЂ™s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) forces lurking just beyond the rice paddies of Phu YenвЂ™s Tuy Hoa Valley. Devised by IFFV as a three phase operation, only Geronimo I produced results. On 4 December 1966, IFFV ended Operation Geronimo I. Army soldiers conducted over ten operations in Phu Yen. To that end, from January 1966 until the end of that year, U.S. As envisaged by IFFV, the use of airmobile infantry battalions would push the enemy away from the population via search and destroy, thereby rapidly advance pacification. Army maneuver battalions attached to IFFV sought to secure the provinceвЂ™s rice production and annihilate nearby enemy main forces. On the same day PeopleвЂ™s Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF)-pejoratively called the Viet Cong-attacked American military assets at SaigonвЂ™s Tan Son Nhut airport, I Field Force Vietnam (IFFV) wrapped-up another operation further north in the Republic of VietnamвЂ™s Phu Yen Province. One involved an attack against the United StatesвЂ™s largest base in the Republic of Vietnam, and the other a U.S. Technically, two significant events occurred on 4 December 1966 during the Vietnam War. Deeper still, Operation Geronimo I demonstrated that operational successes were not trustworthy indicators of progress towards victory during the Vietnam War. In that vein, Operation Geronimo I revealed both the effectiveness and limitations of combating low intensity warfare with highly mobile forces. Small events shape history, yet do so subtly. Yet upon closer examination, this date is representative of what was until recently AmericaвЂ™s longest war. In the context of the 1960s, a decade rife with major milestones for humanity, 4 December 1966, exists on historyвЂ™s periphery. On the surface, 4 December 1966, appears inconsequential.